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T h i sp a p e re x a m i n e sh o wt h ec h o i c eo fe x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ec a ns i g n a lﬁnan-
cial rectitude and, in so doing, inﬂuence a country’s ability to borrow internation-
ally in domestic currency. We develop a model in which the constant probability
of a ‘type change’ creates incentives for disciplined policymakers to ﬁxt h ee x -
change rate in an eﬀort to separate themselves from more opportunistic types.
Because the track record of a policymaker is imperfectly observable, reputational
incentives depend on the past behaviour of previous generations and there is hys-
terisis in the updating behaviour of creditors. ‘Original sin’ — the inﬂationary
track record of one’s predecessors — can reverberate over time leading creditors to
be wary about extending sovereign loans in domestic currency terms. Our ﬁndings
seem consistent with the pattern of the currency composition of debt in Japan
and Russia at the turn of the nineteenth century.
JEL Classiﬁcation:F 3 3 ,F 3 4
21. Introduction
In a recent paper, Eichengreen & Hausmann (1999) highlight a striking character-
istic of the sovereign bonds issued by emerging market countries on global capital
markets. Foreign lenders seem generally unwilling to lend to emerging market
countries in the domestic currency of these countries or, equivalently, to stand on
the other side of a hedge contract. The inability to borrow abroad, and long-term,
in domestic currency exposes emerging market countries to currency mismatches
that exacerbate ﬁnancial instability. Table 1 shows that present shares of emerging
market external debt denominated in own currency are extremely small, especially
when compared with industrialised economies. Indeed, very few countries have
been able to issue bonds in local currency terms since the start of the twentieth
century1.
Despite being an important facet of ﬁnancial stability, there are relatively few
explanations as to why some countries have traditionally been able to borrow
abroad in their own currency, while emerging market countries have not2. Eichen-
1Bordo & Flandreau (2001) suggest that the number has increased to about twenty ﬁve,
from eight countries in 1914. To help combat the problem, several countries in the Asia-Paciﬁc
established a US$1bn fund in June 2003 to purchase sovereign and high quality corporate bonds
in the local currencies of countries in the pool. The fund is to be managed by the Bank for
International Settlements, with capital from the reserves of the major regional central banks,
including Japan, Australia, and Hong Kong.
2Recent attempts include Chamon & Hausmann (2002), Eichengreen et.al (2002), and Jeanne
3green & Hausmann advance “original sin” as one possible reason. They note that
some countries (e.g. Australia) were able to develop domestic debt markets and
create a constituency against opportunistic management of the exchange rate,
whereas others (e.g. Argentina) found it diﬃcult to do so3.Ah i s t o r yo fh i g hi n -
ﬂation and depreciation is held out as a key reason behind creditors’ unwillingness
to lend in a unit that the borrower can manipulate. As Bordo & Rockoﬀ (1996)
and Obstfeld & Taylor (2003) emphasise, a country might therefore favour a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime because it serves as a “good housekeeping seal of approval”
— a signal to creditors of sound ﬁnancial policies.
The experiences of Japan and Russia at the turn of the nineteenth century
illustrate how reputation in one sphere of policy (the monetary framework) spills
over to other spheres (capital market access). In both countries, opportunistic de-
valuation by policymakers and monetary instability led creditors to lend in foreign
currency terms, or to insist on specie and exchange rate clauses in debt contracts.
These measures allowed creditors to extract payments in gold or hard currency in
the event of devaluation. In an eﬀort to build a reputation for creditworthiness,
both Japan and Russia adopted the gold standard in 1897. Despite adhering
(2002).
3For a comprehensive discussion of the nineteenth century experiences of Australia and Ar-
gentina, see Davis & Gallman (2001) and Schwartz (1989).
4to gold for almost two decades, neither country was readily able to engage in
own-currency borrowing.
T h i sp a p e re x a m i n e sh o wt h ec h o i c eo fe x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ec a ns i g n a lar e p u -
tation for ﬁnancial rectitude and, in so doing, inﬂuence the currency composition
of debt. Existing research (e.g. Eichengreen et.al, 2002; Hausmann et.al, 2001)
has not considered the forces that determine country reputations and their inﬂu-
ences on the (in)ability to borrow abroad in domestic currency4. Recent advances
in the game-theoretic analysis of reputation (Tirole, 1996; Mailath & Samuelson,
2001; Tadelis, 1999), however, open the door for such analysis. These models
stress that the identities of key agents in the economy change over time. In an
open economy it means that policymakers running a country can be replaced pe-
riodically, in contrast to the standard treatment of reputation in macroeconomics
(e.g. Backus & Driﬃll, 1985) where government ‘type’ is treated as permanent5.
The constant possibility of a type change creates a desire among ‘disciplined’ pol-
icymakers to separate themselves from ‘opportunistic’ types, leading to equilibria
where reputation is gradually built and maintained.
4Jeanne (2002) is an exception. He considers the eﬀects of monetary credibility on original
sin, but does not explicitly consider how reputations are formed.
5Standard models of reputation require the presence of a ‘tough’ or ‘Stackelberg’ type who
can credibly commit to a particular action (e.g. zero inﬂation). Weak policymakers then acquire
reputations by masquerading as (or pooling with) tough types. As Mailath & Samuelson (2001)
observe, such models rely crucially on agents believing in the possibility of a Stackelberg type.
5We develop a model of a small open economy that builds on these insights.
Each time creditors extend loans to a country, they assign a probability to the
policymaker being disciplined (as opposed to opportunistic) about maintaining
t h ev a l u eo ft h ee x c h a n g er a t ea n d ,b a s e do nt h e s eb e l i e f s ,c h o o s et h ec u r r e n c y
composition of the debt. Creditors then receive repayments, but are unable to
distinguish whether payments arise from good fortune or good economic manage-
ment. Following payment, they properly observe the nature of the macroeconomic
shock and update their beliefs about the type of policymaker with whom they are
dealing. But since policymaker types can change over time in ways that are not
transparent to lenders, there is a possibility that subsequent lending may involve
ad i ﬀerent kind of policymaker. Creditors, thus, constantly update their beliefs
about the type of policymaker they face. Updating causes reputations to have
value, with the premium from having a good record determined by creditors’
perceptions of the proportion of disciplined types in the population.
In such a setting, the complementarity between past and present behaviour
raises the possibility of multiple equilibria. Speciﬁcally, there may be up to three
steady state Markov perfect equilibria depending on parameter values. In the
ﬁrst, disciplined policymakers always maintain a ﬁxed exchange rate regardless of
their records. In the second, disciplined policymakers always act opportunistically,
6despite their track records. And in the third, policymakers ﬁxo n l yi ft h e yh a v ea
good record to maintain. Our analysis suggests that original sin — the track record
of one’s predecessors — generates a persistence in creditors’ willingness to lend in
foreign currency terms. Past behaviour, by shaping the way that achievements are
interpreted, inﬂuences current reputational incentives. The hysterisis generated
by collective reputations means that the length of time on a ﬁxed exchange rate
needed to build a reputation high enough to issue domestic currency debt may be
substantial.
The approach adopted in our paper has parallels in the literature on reputa-
tion in sovereign debt6. Grossman & Van Huyck (1993) analyse a model in which
sovereign debt in local currency serves to shift the risk associated with the unpre-
dictability of tax revenues from the debtor to its creditors. As in our model, they
show how reputation can support a ‘risk shifting’ equilibrium, in which local cur-
rency debt is issued. In the reputational equilibrium, the amount of local currency
debt is such that the short-run gains from repudiation via unexpected devaluation
6Ball (1995) develops a related model of reputation in monetary policy to explore inﬂation
persistence, but follows the Backus-Driﬃll approach in assuming the presence of a ‘Stackelberg’
type. Drazen & Masson (1994) also take a similar approach and, moreover, model the persistent
eﬀects of policy via the structure of the economy rather than the track records of previous
generations. A more explicit treatment of collective reputation in monetary policy is oﬀered by
Sibert (2002). Her focus, however, is on the design and voting intentions of monetary policy
committees.
7are smaller than the long-run costs from the loss of a trustworthy reputation. But
their model lacks suﬃcient structure to pin down the inﬂation rate and does not
explain how reputations are built — the analysis assumes that the length of time
over which lenders remember a repudiation is an exogenous, random, variable.
In another related paper, Cole et.al (1995) develop a model in which govern-
ments attempt to regain access to international credit markets by making partial
repayments on old debt. They argue that such settlements served as a signal of
ﬁnancial probity, and also motivate such signalling by assuming that government
type changes unobservably over time. Access to the loan market is regained once a
disciplined type pays enough to distinguish himself from other types. As a result,
sovereign debtors are able to resume borrowing fairly quickly7.B u tt h el e n g t ho f
time that elapses before emerging market countries are able to issue local currency
debt implies that past behaviour by policymakers may play a more important role
than hitherto suggested.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we motivate the model by
examining the experiences of Japan and Russia in the lead-up to the adoption of
the gold standard by both countries in 1897. In Section 3 we set out the model,
7For example, Cole et.al cite the case of Uruguay which, after defaulting in 1878, was able
to borrow anew by 1888 after reaching a settlement with old bondholders.
8establish conditions when a good reputation has value, and illustrate how hyster-
isis in the updating behaviour of creditors inﬂuences the currency composition of
debt. A ﬁnal section concludes.
2. Reputation and the Gold Standard: Japan and Russia at
the turn of the 19th century
The experiences of Japan and Russia at the end of the 19th century illustrate how
adherence to well understood monetary rules can inﬂuence investors’ perceptions
of a country. Both countries joined the gold standard in the same year (1897),
but whereas Japan was a relative newcomer to international capital markets, Rus-
sia was a seasoned borrower already able to borrow in domestic currency terms.
In each case, policymakers sought membership of the gold standard to build a
reputation for ﬁnancial probity. The ﬁnancial history of both countries has been
well chronicled (e.g. Adams, 1964; Sussman & Yafeh, 2000 for Japan; and Crisp,
1953; Bloomﬁeld, 1963 for Russia). Our treatment will, therefore, be brief and
highlight links between the exchange rate regime and investor perceptions of the
two countries.
92.1. Japan
Following an extended period of isolation, Japan experienced rapid changes in its
ﬁnancial arrangements during the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912). The government
devalued the silver standard and, in 1869, reneged on all silver contracts by re-
writing them in terms of gold. Japan attempted to ﬁx to the gold standard in 1871,
but the simultaneous issue of inconvertible paper money and silver coin meant
that, following a decline in the world price of silver, foreign payments were made
in the more valuable metal. The large-scale outﬂow of gold coin forced Japanese
policymakers back to a silver standard in 1882, but the secular deterioration in
the world price of silver and expansionary monetary policy to ﬁnance government
expenditure contributed to a de facto depreciation of the currency from the mid-
1880s until 1897.
Japan began to access the international capital market in 1870, issuing a bond
of £1 million in London. The issue called for a (high) interest rate of 9%, had
a maturity of 13 years, and required customs revenue as security. After issuing
a further £2.4 million of bonds in 1873, the government withdrew from capital
markets due to the weakness in the yen and fear of creditor sanctions in the event
of payments diﬃculties (Patrick, 1967; Sussman & Yafeh, 2000). Lockwood (1954)
also discusses how foreign investors were discouraged by currency instability as
10policymakers experimented with exchange rate policy before 1897.
The desire to ﬁnance armaments led the government to once again tap inter-
national capital markets at the end of the nineteenth century. The depreciation of
silver meant a rising cost of military imports from gold standard countries. Fol-
lowing the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, from which Japan exacted a convertible-
sterling indemnity worth some 30% of national income to bolster reserves, Japan
adopted the gold standard in 1897. But exchange rate policy was also a cen-
tral plank in a more comprehensive approach towards ﬁnancial development. A
new generation of policymakers under Finance Minister Matsukata had begun
to stress the importance of establishing Japanese government bonds as an inter-
national commodity (Matsukata, 1899). And special credit banks were created
whose role was to encourage foreign capital inﬂows and provide impetus for the
development of a market for domestic bonds (Patrick, 1967).
As Sussman & Yafeh (2000) note, adoption of the gold standard in 1897 im-
proved investor perceptions. The risk premium on foreign currency debt fell from
approximately 4 percentage points to 2 percentage points, maturities lengthened,
unsecured issues became possible, and capital inﬂows increased markedly. Table 2
details Japanese foreign bond issues from 1870—1914. As can be seen, bond issues
were in foreign currency terms (sterling or francs).
11Foreign investors continued to lend to Japan during the 1904-5 war with Rus-
sia, though spreads rose sharply and customs revenues were once again sought
as collateral. Following the victory, the government continued to access foreign
currency debt, including via the issue of debentures by the special credit banks.
Sussman & Yafeh observe that Japan’s reputation for sound ﬁnances during the
war period was such that it was able to withstand subsequent investor concerns
regarding the deterioration of the ﬁscal position. Although Japan was able to ad-
here to the gold standard for 17 years and continued to do so after World War I,
debt continued to be denominated in foreign currency terms8. Exchange rate risk
seems to have remained an issue in the minds of investors, despite the prolonged
maintainence of exchange rate stability.
2.2. Russia
In contrast to Japan, Russia was a seasoned borrower in international capital
markets by the end of the 19th century and able to issue bonds in foreign and
local currency terms from the early 1800s. Her bonds had exchange rate or metallic
clauses in some cases but no clauses in others. Table 3 provides details of selected
8Moulton (1944) suggests that some yen-denominated debt was sold to foreign investors after
the adoption of the gold standard, though it is unclear if these had associated exchange rate
clauses. Nonetheless, these amounts were dwarfed by the size of foreign currency-denominated
debt.
12bond issues for the period 1864—1909.
A feature of Table 3 is the pattern of the currency composition of debt. Be-
tween 1864 and 1887, there were a number of bond issues in paper roubles. From
1887 onwards, however, the majority of issues was in foreign currency or metallic
terms. In part, this pattern reﬂects Bismarck’s 1887 ban on German purchases of
Russian government bonds, but it also reﬂects an increase in exchange rate risk
as loans issued and payable in roubles became objects of speculation by foreign
investors on the Berlin bourse9. Speculation was heightened by the appointment
of Vyshnegradsky, a ﬁnance minister noted for opportunistic intervention in the
foreign exchange market. Koppl & Yeager (1996) estimate the persistence (or
long memory) implicit in the rouble. They ﬁnd that measured persistence be-
tween 1887-92 was markedly greater than in the early 1880s, suggesting currency
instability was due to policy opportunism. Gregory (1979) also notes that the
standard deviation of the exchange rate during the 1886-90 period rose sharply
compared with the period 1881-85. To increase investor conﬁdence, the author-
ities sought (under Finance Minister Witte) to actively stabilise the currency in
9Berlin speculators oﬀered German bonds as collateral for loans in paper roubles from the
Russian government or state-owned entities. These ‘credit’ loans were then used to purchase
more German bonds to repeat the process. Roubles would thus accumulate in Berlin and,
following a price fall, speculators would redeem their mark-denominated securities for more
roubles than had been loaned, making a proﬁt in the process.
131894 and began to make payments in gold, rather than roubles.
L i k eJ a p a n ,R u s s i af o r m a l l yj o i n e dt h eg o l ds t a n d a r di n1 8 9 7 .C r i s p( 1 9 5 3 )a n d
Drummond (1976) describe how the desire for improved capital market access was
paramount in the minds of policymakers. Adherence to the gold standard had an
immediate eﬀect. Capital inﬂows increased sharply, and the cost of borrowing on
public debt fell from around 4.2% in 1891 to 3.9% in 1903. Nonetheless, although
Russia was also on the gold standard for a further seventeen years, investors
continued to question the commitment to gold. Bloomﬁeld (1963) documents
how, in 1905, foreign investors worried that Russia would devalue or return to
ﬂoating exchange rates. Although the gold commitment regained some credibility
in 1906 with an emergency loan from a consortium of European private banks,
foreign lenders were unwilling to remove exchange rate clauses from debt contracts,
suggesting that Russia had begun to suﬀer from ‘original sin’.
3. The Model
3.1. Building Blocks
Consider a small open economy that must borrow to produce output. Time is dis-
crete and has an inﬁnite horizon. The economy is run by a group of policymakers of
14unit mass who are matched, at each interval t =0 ,1,2...∞, with a corresponding
mass of atomistic creditors. Policymakers diﬀer in their behavioural preferences
and belong to two indistinguishable types — disciplined or D-types in proportion
∆, and opportunistic or O-types in proportion 1 − ∆. D-types face a lower cost
of maintaining ﬁxed exchange rates than O-types, but incur higher costs if they
renege on their commitment to the peg. As noted in the introduction, this may
reﬂect diﬀerent attitudes to the presence of currency mismatches in the economy.
The distribution of types is assumed to be constant over time.
The tenure of a policymaker follows an exponential distribution, i.e. a poli-
cymaker alive at time t remains in oﬃce upto at least t +1with an exogenous
probability 1−λ ∈ (0,1). If a policymaker loses oﬃce, he is replaced by a succes-
sor so that only a single generation is in control during any one period. Creditors
cannot observe the exit or replacement of the policymaker and, at the start of
each date, are unsure whether a policymaker has been ‘reincarnated’ as another
type. The idea is that while a change in government is usually observable, shifts
in internal politics and lobbying activity are less so. For example, a government
may replace the central bank governor or a ﬁnance minister without any outward
signs of a shift in policy. But creditors know that such replacements are possible
and take this into account when forming expectations and making decisions.
15We suppose that the policymaker minimises a loss function of the form





t + C(πt), (1)
where yt and e y are real and target output, πt i st h er a t eo fi n ﬂation, and C(πt)
reﬂects the ﬁxed costs of maintaining (or abandoning) a commitment to a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime. Following Backus & Driﬃll (1985), we make the simplifying
assumption that the loss function is linear in output. If PPP holds, and with
suitable normalisation of the foreign price level, the inﬂation rate corresponds to
the realised rate of currency depreciation so that πt =0for a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime. The function C(πt) is of the form:
C(πt)=

      








, where i = D,O. (2)
In what follows 0 <θ D < 1,θ O =1 , c>0, and c =0 . The assumption that c =0
is made for analytical tractability and does not entail any loss of generality.
The per—period output of the economy is inﬂuenced by the amount of the loan,
Lt, that the policymaker is able to borrow from his creditors. To highlight the
16role of reputation, we consider only short-term debt and exclude the possibility
that output can be stored or invested. So a country borrows for a project, the
loan becomes due, and then further borowing is needed for subsequent output.
We therefore suppose
yt = Lt − εt, (3)
where εt is a conditional i.i.d supply shock with zero mean that cannot be observed
by creditors until the end of the period10. In keeping with the time inconsistency
literature, there is a wedge between desired output and the ‘natural’ output made
possible by borrowing, so that e y − Lt = k.
When extending loans to the country, creditors must decide whether to lend in
domestic currency or foreign currency terms. Under the assumption of uncovered
interest parity and normalising real foreign interest rates to be zero (r∗
t =0 ), we
can express the real burden of debt as11:
Lt [m(1 + πt)+( 1− m)(1 − (πt − π
e
t))], (4)
10We abstract from competitiveness eﬀects on output in order to simplify the algebra and
focus attention on reputational forces.
11See Falcetti & Missale (2002) for a similar approach.











Notice that an unexpected depreciation lowers the real burden of domestic cur-
rency debt, whereas an anticipated depreciation has no eﬀect. By contrast, de-
preciation (whether unanticipated or anticipated) raises the real burden of foreign
currency debt. Clearly if the policymaker was commited to maintaining a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime, πt = πe
t =0 , and the real burden of the debt would be Lt
regardless of the currency composition. Thus, by lending in foreign currency the
creditor is less exposed to policymaker opportunism — he receives Lt if the D-type
commits to the peg, compared with Lt(1 + πt) if the D-type ﬂoats. By choosing
to lend in domestic currency, the creditor receives Lt − Lt(πt − πe
t) if the D-type
reneges on his commitment to ﬁxt h ee x c h a n g er a t e .
N e to u t p u ti ne a c hp e r i o di st h e r e f o r e
yt = Lt − Lt [m(1 + πt)+( 1− m)(1− πt + π
e
t)] − εt. (5)
In order to service debt at the end of period t, output must be suﬃcient to meet
18the real debt burden, so
ε
∗
t = Lt [1 − m(1 + πt) − (1 − m)(1− πt + π
e
t)] (6)
is the realisation of the supply shock that exhausts the debtor’s surplus. We
abstract from the problem of a sovereign’s willingness to pay (e.g Eaton & Gerso-
vitz, 1981) and assume that creditors are able to make the country pay all it can.
Debt is repaid in full if εt ≤ ε∗
t, whereas partial payments are made if εt >ε ∗
t.







[1 − m(1 + πt) − (1 − m)(1− πt + πe
t)]
. (7)
If εt is uniformly distributed with suﬃciently wide support, εt ∼ U [−Z, Z],





2Z and, conversely, the probability of a bad payments outcome is




2Z .L e th ∈ {G,B} denote the payments track record of
the policymaker.
If we ignore the ﬁxed cost term C(πt),t h eﬁrst-order condition to the minimi-
sation problem implied by equations (1) and (5) balances the net output gain from
19unexpected inﬂation against the cost of an extra unit of inﬂation at the margin.
So the policymaker chooses
πt =( 2 m − 1)Lt, (8)
allowing the ex post policy losses under the ﬂexible and ﬁxed exchange rate regimes
to be characterised as
Wt,flex = −Lt [m(1 + (2m − 1)Lt)+( 1− m)(1 − (2m − 1)Lt + π
e
t)]








Wt,fix = −Lt [m +( 1− m)(1 + π
e
t)] − εt − k.
A policymaker will choose to devalue if
Wt,fix − Wt,flex > (1 − θi)c (9)
Since Wt,fix >W t,flex for the O-type, he always prefers to opportunistically
manipulate the currency. In contrast, D-types face a choice between rules and
discretion. The D-type prefers to maintain a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ei ft h es i z e
20of the debt (and hence the output shock, εt) is not too large. In particular, the




(2m − 1)(m − 0.5)
. (10)
Notice that L =
p
2(1 − θD)c when m =0and also when m =1 , i.e the thresh-
old point at which the D-type devalues is the same regardless of the currency
composition of the debt.
Creditors are thus faced with both adverse selection and moral hazard. As they
cannot observe the replacement of policymakers, they cannot recognise the type
they are dealing with. And since creditors cannot see the supply shock, they are
unsure if their repayments reﬂect a poor outturn of nature or wilful devaluation
by the policymaker. Moreover, since there is a continuum of myopic creditors,
no single creditor is able to individually aﬀect the play of the policymaker or the
future play of the game. The only concern for the creditor is the probability he
assigns to the policymaker delivering a good payments outcome in each period. So
whenever a creditor is matched with a policymaker, he forms a conjecture about
the composition of the policymaking group and their past and present behaviour
based on the observed track record of debt repayment.
21Events in each period unfold as follows. At the beginning of period t, creditors
are matched with policymakers and extend loans. They assign a probability, φt,t o
the policymaker being disciplined and, based on these beliefs, choose the currency
composition of the debt, m(φt). The output shock is observed by policymakers,
who make their exchange rate choices. Creditors then receive their repayments
from the output that is produced. At this stage, they are able to observe the
realised value of the output shock and update their beliefs about the type of
policymaker they are facing. At the end of the period, with probability λ,t h e
policymaker leaves oﬃce and is replaced by a successor. The sequence of events
is illustrated in Figure 1.
3.2. The Value of a Good Reputation
We follow Tirole (1996) and analyse steady states of the model developed in
Section 3.1. Since the O-type always sets exchange rate policy opportunistically,
our attention is on the value to the D-type from reputation building. A key feature
of the framework is the possibility that a D-type may always be replaced by an
O-type at the end of each period. This provides the D-type with incentives to ﬁx
the exchange rate so as to separate himself from O-types.I ns od o i n g ,t h eD-type
gradually builds and develops a reputation for creditworthiness and a commitment
22to low inﬂation.
Let φt,h ≡ Pr[D|h] be the probability that the creditor assigns to the pol-
icymaker being disciplined, given that he observes payments record, h.U p o n
observing a good record, the creditor’s expectation of inﬂation is
π
e
t,G = φt,GLt(2m − 1). (11)
Substituting πe
t,G and the expression for πt into the loss function yields
Wt = −Lt[1 + π
e






2 − k − εt,
and taking expectations gives
Et−1(Wt)=−Lt[1 + π
e







So the present discounted value of losses under discretion is
V (φt,G)=−Lt[1 + π
e





























2 − Lt(1 + π
e
t,G(1 − m)) − k] − εt +( 1− θD)c. (12)
A similar expression can be obtained for VB. It follows that the gain from having
a good record at time t is








If m =1 , the ex post v a l u eo fl o s s e si st h es a m e ,r e g a r d l e s so ft r a c kr e c o r d .U n d e r
these circumstances there are no long-term beneﬁts to having a good track record
— if creditors lend in foreign currency, the only value to a D-type from maintaining
the peg is from the short-run gain from doing so.
To ﬁnd πe
t,h, we make use of Bayes’ Rule to identify the conditional probabili-
ties. In particular,
φt,G ≡ Pr[D | G]=λ∆ +( 1− λ)
∆Pr[G | fix]
∆Pr[G | fix]+( 1− ∆)Pr[G | flex]
,(14)
φt,B ≡ Pr[D | B]=λ∆ +( 1− λ)
∆Pr[B | fix]
∆Pr[B | fix]+( 1− ∆)Pr[B | flex]
.
The numerator of the fraction in the second part of equation (14) represents the
24mass of ﬁxing D-types with a good record, and the denominator the total mass
of policymakers with good records. The term captures the creditors’ perception
of the proportion of disciplined ‘ﬁxers’ among the population, if policymakers
are known to stay in oﬃce with probability 1 − λ. Better past behaviour by
one’s peers (reﬂected in a higher Pr[G | fix]) raises present incentives for good
behaviour. Other things equal, it raises πe
t,G and lowers πe
t,B.T h e r e i s t h u s a
complementarity between past and present behaviour — when policymakers have
behaved well in the past, creditors are more willing to attribute causality to past
actions. A policymaker’s record becomes a more informative signal of his type.
Appendix 1A derives πe
t,G,πe
t,B in terms of the exogenous parameters of the
model. Here we highlight the relationship between reputational incentives and
peer group characteristics with the aid of simple numerical examples. Group
composition, ∆,i n ﬂuences the value of a good reputation through its eﬀects on
beliefs. Figure 2 shows that VG − VB is concave and single-peaked as a function
of ∆, reﬂecting the nature of the updating rules with exogenous replacements.
Note VG − VB =0when ∆ =0and ∆ =1 . Intuitively, if a group becomes too
homogenous then the incentives to build a reputation disappear12.
12The point that the persistent possibility of a type change can sustain ﬁrst-best incentives
was ﬁrst noted by Holmstrom (1982) in the context of the market for managerial talent.
25Changes in the likelihood of replacement, λ, have an unambiguous eﬀect on
reputational incentives (Figure 3). If replacement is certain, λ =1 , a D-type
has no incentive to cultivate a reputation and chooses exchange rate policy in
accordance with the rule speciﬁed in (9). If there are no replacements, λ =0 ,
policymaker type is permanent but not observable by lenders, bringing the model
in line with conventional treatments of reputation (e.g. Backus & Driﬃll, 1985).
If a D-type were to ever devalue, it would be regarded as an O-type forever. So
long as the policymaker is not too impatient (i.e. ﬁx i n gt h ee x c h a n g er a t ei s
preferred to the one-shot gain from devaluation), reputation has value and the
D-type chooses to ﬁx the exchange rate13.
3.3. Exchange Rate Choice and the Currency Composition of Debt
We now consider the role played by reputation in supporting the exchange rate
choice of the D-type policymaker and the currency composition of debt issued by
the creditors. Since the creditor’s posterior probability that the policymaker is a
D-type — the state variable, φt — completely summarises the direct eﬀect of the
past on the current environment, we focus attention on Markov strategies. In a
13In the Mailath & Samuelson (2001) framework, the pure strategy equilibrium without re-
placements calls for the D-type to always devalue. Their result, however, depends on a symmetry
assumption, namely Pr[G | fix]=P r [ B | flex], which does not hold here.
26Markov perfect equilibrium, policymakers minimise their loss functions, creditors’
expectations are correct, and creditors use Bayes’ rule to update posteriors. The
posterior probability, φt, is given by
φt =P r [ D | G] × Pr(G)+P r [ D | B] × Pr(B)












and creditors’ expectation of inﬂation is therefore
π
e
t = φtLt(2m − 1). (15)
The complementarity between past and present behaviour, coupled with the
fact that πe
t inﬂuences the probability of good and bad states via its eﬀects on
ε∗
t, suggests the possibility of multiple equilibrium expected inﬂation rates in the
model. Speciﬁcally, depending on parameter values, there may be up to three
steady state Markov perfect equilibria:
• a steady state where the D-type always adopts a ﬁxed exchange rate;
• a steady state where the D-type always adopts a ﬂoating exchange rate;
27• an intermediate steady state where the D-type ﬁx e si fh eh a sag o o dr e c o r d ,
but ﬂoats if he does not.
Appendix 1B derives πe
t in terms of the parameters of the model. Substituting
πe
t, along with the expression for πt (equation 8), into the policymaker’s loss
function yields the realised ex post loss at time t when the policymaker has the
option of changing the exchange rate — denote this by Wt, flex(φt).U n d e raﬁxed
exchange rate, πt =0 , so the relevant loss function is Wt, fix(φt). The D-type
always ﬁxes when










(1−λ)[Pr[G | flex]VD(φt,G)+Pr[B | flex]VD(φt,B)].
Equation (16) compares the present discounted value of present and future payoﬀs
when the D-type always ﬁxes with the payoﬀs that arise when a D-type opts to
28devalue, initially and in the future. In other words, it establishes the circumstances
under which the primitive parameters governing group reputation support the
choice of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime by a D-type.
The cubic nature of πe
t suggests the possibility of a third, intermediate, equi-
librium in addition to the two steady states of always ﬁxing and always ﬂoating.
Here the D-type ﬁxes only when he has a good record to maintain. From Appendix
1B, a necessary condition for an intermediate steady state is a>0,i . e
1 − ∆ + Lt(
p
2(1 − θD)c − ∆) > 0,
which can alternatively be expressed as






2(1 − θD)c. Thus a policymaker’s decision to ﬁxd e p e n d so nh o w
good past behaviour has been, i.e. on the size of Pr[G | fix]. The importance of
a good track record for a present policymaker, i.e. the complementarity between
past and present behaviour, diminishes the more costly is an opportunistic devalu-
ation ((1−θD)c), and is strengthened the greater the proportion of D-types in the
population (∆). Equation (17) also suggests that the supply of loans is an impor-
29tant constraint on the policymaker’s choice. The larger the quantum of lending,
Lt, the greater the importance of a good track record for current behaviour.
It remains to determine when creditors will choose to issue debt in domestic
currency to a D-type, i.e. the circumstances under which m(φt)=0 . Creditors
will lend in domestic currency terms if the expected return from local currency
debt is greater than the expected return from foreign currency debt, given a good
record. So m(φt)=0if:
Pr[D | G].Lt+[1−Pr[D | G]].[Lt−Lt(πt−π
e
t)] ≥ Pr[D | G].Lt+[1−Pr[D | G]].[Lt(1+πt)]
(18)
In other words, the investor’s choice of the currency composition of debt depends
on the inﬂation risk premium. In particular, m(φt)=0when
Lt[1 − (πt − π
e




t(φ) − 2πt ≥ 0. (19)
303.4. Building Trust
How long must a D-type maintain a ﬁxed exchange rate before creditors are willing
to lend in domestic currency? Let T be the number of periods of exchange rate
ﬁxing which makes a policymaker just indiﬀerent between the ex post losses from







Pr[G | fix]VD(φt,G)+P r [ B | fix]VD(φt,B)
¤
(20)






Pr[G | flex]VD(φt,G)+P r [ B | flex]VD(φt,B)
¤
=0






















Z +( Lt + πe
t)S






Taken together, equations (21) and (19) allow us to identify b T,t h em i n i m u m
number of periods of successful pegging that must elapse before creditors are
indiﬀerent between the currency composition of debt. Figure 4 illustrates this
situation by plotting the net payoﬀso ft h eD-type over time. To the left of b T,t h e
31D-type prefers to ﬁx the exchange rate and creditors lend in foreign currency terms.
b T is increasing in λ and decreasing in ∆.I n t u i t i v e l y ,a sD-types are more likely to
be replaced, creditors require the policymaker to demonstrate his commitment to
the peg for much longer. And fewer periods on an exchange rate peg are needed,
the greater the proportion of D-types in the population. Clearly, the minimum
number of periods of successful pegging required to build a reputation suﬃcient
to be able to borrow in domestic currency can be substantial.
4. Conclusion
The inability of countries at the periphery of the international monetary system
to borrow in domestic currency, or to hedge exchange rate risk, exposes these
economies to large-scale currency mismatches that excarbate ﬁnancial instability.
One explanation for this feature of the international ﬁnancial landscape is that
a history of high inﬂation and opportunistic management of the exchange rate
makes creditors unwilling to lend in a currency that the borrower can manipulate.
We show that original sin — the inﬂationary track record of one’s predecessors
— plays an important role in shaping the currency composition of sovereign debt.
A policymaker’s current incentives to manage the exchange rate are aﬀected by
his past behaviour and, because his track record is imperfectly observed by other
32agents in the economy, by the behaviour of his predecessors as well. This generates
incentives for policymakers to try to ﬁx the exchange rate to build a reputation
for ﬁnancial probity and to distinguish themselves from those who would try to
opportunistically manipulate the exchange rate. Countries may, therefore, try
to limit exchange rate movements to acquire a ‘good housekeeping seal of ap-
proval’, notwithstanding the costs of ﬁxing. The complementarity between past
and present behaviour means that there is hysterisis in the updating behaviour
of creditors, which leads them to be wary about extending credit in domestic
currency.
Our ﬁndings seem consistent with the pattern of the currency composition
of debt in Japan and Russia at the turn of the nineteenth century. Policymak-
ers actively engaged in opportunistic manipulation of the exchange rate, leading
investors to lend in foreign currency terms or to stipulate exchange clauses in
debt contracts. The sceptical attitude of investors towards the monetary frame-
work extended well beyond the adoption of the gold standard by both countries
in 1897. Although opportunistic policymakers were replaced by more disciplined
types who saw commitment to the gold standard as a means of promoting capital
market access and developing domestic bond markets, neither Japan or Russia
was readily able to engage in own-currency borrowing for a considerable length of
33time.
It is important to note that reputation is not the only factor inﬂuencing the
currency composition of debt. Market microstructure and limits to portfolio di-
versiﬁcation are also likely to be key inﬂuences on the ability of a country to issue
domestic currency debt. Eichengreen & Hausmann (2003) argue that the opti-
mal portfolio for the typical investor has a limited number of currencies. Each
additional currency adds costs and risks, whilst bringing opportunities for diver-
siﬁcation. It means that investors are likely to have a declining appetite for exotic
currencies. So if a country is able to convince investors to hold its currency in their
portfolios, it makes it harder for other countries to do likewise. They advocate
international initiatives to help develop liquid debt markets and erode perceptions
of exotic currency debt.
A number of countries in the Asia-Paciﬁc have moved in this direction by
recently establishing an Asian Bond Fund (ABF). The ABF is managed by the
Bank for International Settlements and backed by the capital of high credit-rated
countries such as Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. The aim is to buy sovereign
local currency debt issued by Asian governments on international capital markets.
Currency mismatches are eﬀectively eliminated, since the countries backing the
fund are able to hedge their exposure to the local currencies. In the medium—long
34term, the intention of such a fund is to encourage private sector involvement in
local bond markets, increasing liquidity and improving the lending terms for gov-
ernments in the region. While such international solutions may be insuﬃcient to
resolve the problem of original sin on their own, they may be a useful supplement
to the development of credible institutions and policy frameworks.
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41Appendix
1A Creditors’ Expectations of Inﬂation, Given Track Record
Since εt ∼ U[−Z,Z], we can calculate the conditional probabilities
Pr[G | fix]=ε∗
ε ;P r [ G | flex]= Z
2Z−ε;
Pr[B | fix]=ε−ε∗
ε ;P r [ B | flex]= Z−ε
2Z−ε.
Noting that ε∗
t = Lt[1−m(1+πt)−(1−m)(1− πt + πe









Pr[G | flex] ≡ B
=
Z




Since reputations only have value when m =0 , and using (11) we obtain
π
e
t,G = −λ∆Lt − (1 − λ)
∆ALt
∆A +( 1− ∆)B
(A1)














t[Y + S(λ∆Lt +( 1− λ))] + SZ(1 − ∆),
cG = Lt∆[LtY (λ∆Lt − λ +1 )+λSZ(1 − ∆)],
S =
p
2(1 − θD)c, Y =2 Z + LtS.
We obtain the expression for πe











aB = S[S − ∆L],
bB = ∆Y (S−Lt)+S(1−∆)(Y −Z)+λ∆LtS2(1−∆)+[λ∆2+(1−λ)S](S−Lt),
cB = ∆[λLtS(Y − Z)+( 1− λ)(S − Lt)LtY + λ∆Lt(SZ − LtY )].
1B Equilibrium Expected Inﬂation
From (15), creditors’ equilibrium expectations of inﬂation are given by
43π
e
t = φLt(2m − 1).
Making use of the probabilities and the expressions for S and Y in Appendix 1A,











t + d =0
where
a =4 Z2LtS∆[1 − ∆ + Lt(S − ∆)];
b =4 Z2[Lt(∆(Y −S)+S2(SY +∆)+∆2(Z −Y )+SY∆(Lt−S)−S2∆(SY +




c =4 Z2S[Lt(∆(Y −Z)+∆2(Z −Y )+Y 2(S +∆2−S∆)+LtY ∆(S −Y ∆))−
Y (Z(2∆ − 1 − ∆2)+Y (∆ − 1)2] − L2





LtY ∆λ(S −∆)+∆2λ(Z −Y )]−SLt(Z +L2
t)[Lt(S −∆−Sλ+∆λ)+∆λLt(S −
∆)+∆λ(1 − ∆)];
d = Lt∆S[Lt(1−λ +λ∆) −λY (1−∆)](Z −L2
t)+Lt[LtY (S −∆)+λ∆(Y −
44Z)+LtYλ (∆ − S)+LtY ∆λ(S − ∆)+∆2λ(Z − Y )](Z + L2
t).






















27a3 (2b3 − 9abc +2 7 a2d).
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 Table 1: Share of External Debt Denominated in Domestic Currency (Selected 
countries, bonded debt only, in percentages, end 1999. Source: Bank for 
International Settlements) 
 
  Corporate Financial  Public  Sector 
Asia Pacific     
China  0 0 0 
Indonesia  2 0 0 
South  Korea  0 0 0 
    
Latin America     
Argentina  3 1 2 
Chile  0 0 0 
Mexico  0 0 0 
    
Europe      
Russia  0 0 0 
Poland 12  0  0 
    
Industrial World     
Japan  44 28 16 
United  Kingdom  44 36 13 
United  States  78 83 95 
 Table 2: Japanese Bond Issues in London, 1870 – 1914. Source: Adams, 1964, and 









£1 1870  9  13  Customs  revenue 
7% Sterling 
bonds 
£2.4 1873  7  25  ″ 
5% Sterling 
bonds 
£4.39 1897  5  53  ″ 
4% Sterling 
bonds 
£10.0 1899  4  55  ″ 
6% Sterling 
bonds 
£22.0 1904  6  7  Customs  revenue 
4.5% Sterling 
bonds 




£25.0 1905  4  25  - 
5% Sterling 
bonds 
£23 1907  5  40  - 
4% French franc 
bonds 
FFr 450  1910  4  60  - 
4% Sterling 
bonds 
£11 1910  4  60  - 
Sterling railway 
certificates 





FFr 200  1913  5  10  - 
Sterling railway 
certificates 
£2.5 1914 4.75 
(discount) 
1 - 
 Table 3: Russian Bond Issues in London and Paris, 1864 – 1909. Source: Crisp, 
1976, Flandreau and Sussman, 2002. 
 
Year Yield(%)  Currency  Coupons 
1864 5.0  Paper  Rouble*  No 
1866 5.0  Paper  Rouble  No 
1869 5.0  Paper  Roubles  No 
1870 5.0  Paper  Roubles*  Roubles 
1871 5.0  Paper  Roubles*  Roubles 
1872 5.0  Paper  Roubles*  Roubles 
1873 5.0  Paper  Roubles*  Roubles 
1876 5.0  Paper  Roubles  No 
1877 5.0  Paper  Roubles  No 
1878 5.0  Paper  Roubles  No 
1879 5.0  Paper  Roubles  No 
1880  4.0  Metallic Roubles  Gold, Current Rate 
1880 4.5  Gold  Roubles  Gold 
1881 5.0  Paper  Roubles  No 
1881 4.5  Silver  Roubles  Silver 
1887 5.0  Marks  Marks 
1889 5.0  Paper  Rouble  No 
1889 3.0  Gold  Roubles  Gold 
1889  4.0  Gold Roubles  Sterling, Francs, Marks, Florins, Current Roubles 
1891 3.0  Gold  Roubles  Gold 
1893 4.0  Silver  bonds  Silver 
1894 4.0  Sterling  Sterling 
1894 3.0  Gold  Roubles  Gold 
1894 4.0  Gold  Roubles  Gold 
1894 3.5  Gold  Roubles  Gold 
1896 3.0  Gold  Roubles  Gold 
1906 5.0  Gold  Roubles  Gold 
1909 4.5  Gold  Roubles  Gold 
* Bonds denominated in other currencies were also issued in these years.  